Question 1

A secret is 2-out-of-3 shared among Alice (party 1), Bob (party 2), and Charlie (party 3) via Shamir's scheme. The modulus is q = 5.

(a) Bob's share is 4. Charlie's share is 2. What is the secret?

Solution: All the arithmetic is modulo 5. The shares are the values $\ell(2) = 4$ and $\ell(3) = 2$ on a line $\ell(x) = s + a \cdot x$. The secret is $\ell(0) = s$. To recover it we solve s + 2a = 4 And s + 3a = 2, from where $s = 3(s + 2a) - 2(s + 3a) = 3 \cdot 4 - 2 \cdot 2 = 3$.

(b) Alice, Bob, and Charlie want to "rerandomize" their shares without changing the secret. Alice replaces her old share with a random number r modulo 5. Explain how Bob and Charlie should recompute their new shares with Alice's assistance.

Solution: From part (a) a is also 3, so Alice's share is $\ell(1) = 3 + 1 \cdot 3 = 1$. Both the old shares ℓ and new shares ℓ' must satisfy the interpolation identity $\ell(0) = 2\ell(1) - \ell(2)$, so $2\ell(1) - \ell(2) = 2\ell'(1) - \ell'(2)$. Therefore $\ell'(2) - \ell(2) = 2(\ell'(1) - \ell(1)) = 2(r - 1)$. Alice sends the value 2(r - 1) to Bob and he adds it to his old share. Similarly, the secret is reconstructed from Bob's and Charlie's shares as $\ell(0) = -\ell(1) + 2\ell(3)$). By the same argument $\ell'(3) - \ell(3) = 3(\ell'(1) - \ell(1)) = 3(r - 1)$. Alice sends 3(r - 1) to Charlie and he adds it to his old share.

(c) Alice and Charlie want to subtract 1 from the secret without talking to Bob. How should they modify their shares?

Solution: Suppose Alice and Charlie could share the "secret" 1 by a line ℓ_1 while ensuring that Bob's share $\ell_1(1)$ is a zero. Then $\ell - \ell_1$ would be shares of $\ell(0) - \ell_1(0) = \ell(0) - 1$, namely the old secret minus one. ℓ_1 is the unique line that interpolates through $\ell_1(0) = 1$ and $\ell_1(2) = 0$. This is the line $\ell_1(t) = 1 + 2t$. So Alice should subtract $\ell_1(1) = 3$ from her share and Bob should subtract $\ell_1(3) = 2$ from his. Their new shares are 2 and 4.

Here is another way of arriving at the same solution. Their initial shares are a = s + r, b = s + 2r, c = s + 3r. The new shares should be of the form a' = s - 1 + r', b' = s - 1 + 2r', and c' = s' - 1 + 3r'. As Bob's share should remain the same, b and b' should be equal, namely b' = b, or 2r' - 1 = 2r, or r' - r = 3. Solving for a' and c' in terms of a and c we obtain a' = (a - 1) + (r' - r) = a + 2 and c' = (c - 1) + 3(r' - r) = c + 3.

Question 2

In this question you will investigate circuits for the millionaires' problem (the argmax function).

(a) Design arithmetic circuits (with plus and times gates) for the functions NOT x, x_1 AND x_2 , and x_1 OR x_2 . The gates operate modulo q (for q prime). The circuits should produce the correct output when the inputs x, x_1 , x_2 take the values 0 (false) and 1 (true).

Solution: The circuit for NOT x is 1-x. The circuit for x_1 AND x_2 is $x_1 \cdot x_2$. As x_1 OR $x_2 =$ NOT (NOT x_1 AND NOT x_2), the circuit for x_1 OR x_2 is $1-(1-x_1)(1-x_2)$.

(b) Design a Boolean circuit (with NOT, AND, OR gates) for the less than or equal function

$$leq(x,y) = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } x \le y, \\ 0, & \text{if } x > y. \end{cases}$$

Assume the numbers x and y are provided in bit representation as n-bit strings. What is the size of circuit in big-theta notation?

Solution: Let's write x = ax' and y = by' with a, b being their most significant bits. x is at most y if a = 0 and b = 1, or if they are the same and $x' \le y'$. In boolean logic this says

$$leq(x,y) = (NOT \ a \ AND \ b) \ OR \ (((a \ AND \ b) \ OR \ (NOT \ a \ AND \ NOT \ b) \ AND \ leq(x',y'))$$

This formula provides a recursive construction of a circuit for n-bit leq from a circuit for (n-1)-bit leq with nine extra gates. The recurrence for size is therefore S(n) = S(n-1) + 9. The base case is S(0) = 0 (leq = 1 when n = 0). It solves to S(n) = 9n, so the size is $\Theta(n)$.

(c) Use parts (a) and (b) to design an arithmetic circuit for the function

$$\operatorname{argmax}(x, y, z) = \begin{cases} 100, & \text{if } x > y \text{ and } x > z, \\ 010, & \text{if } y > x \text{ and } y > z, \\ 001, & \text{if } z > x \text{ and } z > y. \end{cases}$$

Your circuit may output anything in case some two inputs are equal. What is its size in big-theta notation?

Solution: The first output is NOT leq(x, y) OR NOT leq(x, z). The second and the third are specified analogously. This circuit uses six copies of leq and nine extra gates. Its size is also $\Theta(n)$.

Question 3

The code \mathcal{C} consists of all 7 bit strings $\mathbf{x} = x_1x_2x_3x_4x_5x_6x_7$ that satisfy these three constraints modulo two:

$$x_4 + x_5 + x_6 + x_7 = 0$$
 and $x_2 + x_3 + x_6 + x_7 = 0$ and $x_1 + x_3 + x_5 + x_7 = 0$. (1)

If the index 1 to 7 is written out in binary representation, each constraint corresponds to a bit of the index, and it involves only those indices for which this bit is set to 1:

$$x_{\underline{100}} + x_{\underline{101}} + x_{\underline{110}} + x_{\underline{111}} = 0$$

$$x_{\underline{010}} + x_{\underline{011}} + x_{\underline{110}} + x_{\underline{111}} = 0$$

$$x_{\underline{001}} + x_{\underline{011}} + x_{\underline{101}} + x_{\underline{111}} = 0.$$

(a) Show that for every assignment to $x_3x_5x_6x_7$ there exists a unique assignment to $x_1x_2x_4$ that satisfies all the constraints (1).

Solution: System (1) can be solved for x_1, x_2, x_4 in terms of x_3, x_5, x_6, x_7 :

$$x_4 = x_5 + x_6 + x_7$$

$$x_2 = x_3 + x_6 + x_7$$

$$x_1 = x_3 + x_5 + x_7$$

As this system is equivalent to (1), $x_1x_2x_4$ always exists and is uniquely determined.

(b) Use part (a) to count the number of elements (codewords) in \mathcal{C} .

Solution: There are 16 codewords. Each of x_3, x_5, x_6, x_7 can take one of two bit values so there are $2^4 = 16$ possible assignments to $x_3x_5x_6x_7$. As these determine $x_1x_2x_4$ they account for all the codewords.

(c) Argue that if \mathbf{x} is in \mathcal{C} and \mathbf{y} differs from \mathbf{x} in position i only then the right-hand side of (1), when applied to \mathbf{y} and read from top to bottom, equals the binary representation of i.

Solution: As \mathbf{x} is in the code it satisfies all the equations. Flipping the *i*-th bit of \mathbf{x} flips the right-hand side of those equations that contain x_i . The *j*-th equation contains x_i exactly when *j* is set to 1 in the binary expansion of the index *i*. So the right-hand sides of precisely those equations that point to 1-bits in the binary expansion of *i* are set to 1.

(d) Use part (c) to argue that \mathcal{C} has distance at least 3.

Solution: If not, there would be two distinct codewords \mathbf{x} , \mathbf{x}' within distance at most 2. There is then some \mathbf{y} that differs from both and \mathbf{x} , \mathbf{x}' by at most a bit flip. By part (c) The right-hand side of (1) evaluated on \mathbf{y} identifies the bit flipped, or equals zero if no bit was flipped. The only possibilities are that \mathbf{y} was obtained from both \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{x}' by flipping the same bit, or by flipping no bit. In both cases \mathbf{x} and \mathbf{x}' must be equal to one another, contradicting their distinctness.

(e) Use part (c) to design an algorithm that corrects up to one error in C: Given y that differs from a codeword x in at most one bit it outputs this x.

Solution: The algorithm plugs \mathbf{y} into (1). If the right-hand side is zero it does nothing to \mathbf{y} . If not, it flips the bit whose binary expansion is the right-hand side of the equations.

(f) (**Optional**) Show that up to a permutation of the indices \mathcal{C} is the Hamming [7, 4, 3] code from Lecture 7.

Solution: We rearrange the outputs in the code \mathcal{H} from lecture to put the message bit m_1 in position 3, m_2 in position 5, m_3 in position 6, and m_4 in position 7. We set the remaining bits to $m_1 + m_2 + m_4$ in position 1, $m_1 + m_3 + m_4$ in position 2, and $m_2 + m_3 + m_4$ in position 4. The encoding is now set up so that all codewords satisfy (1). So all the codewords in the rearranged \mathcal{H} are also in \mathcal{C} . Can there be any spurious codewords in \mathcal{C} that do not come from \mathcal{H} ? No, because both \mathcal{H} and \mathcal{C} have 16 codewords. The two must be equal.

Question 4

A codeword of the Reed-Solomon code with message length k = 5 and codeword length n = 11 has been corrupted in at most 3 positions. You can find your personalized corrupted codeword here. Find the message $\mathbf{m} = m_0 m_1 m_2 m_3 m_4$. You may use any algorithm you like. Explain clearly how you arrived at your solution.

Solution: My instance is $\mathbf{y} = 4$ 6 7 6 10 10 3 6 7 7 0. My program searched through all 11^5 possible messages and their encodings to find the one that differs from \mathbf{y} in at most three positions. It found the solution $\mathbf{m} = 4$ 5 9 9 1 that encodes to 4 6 6 6 10 2 1 6 7 7 0. The errors are at positions 2, 5, and 6 (starting the count from zero). In this example the search space is small enough that brute force does the job magnificently. Here is the code.